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Abstract 
This article presents an evaluation approach for 
alternative electronic market designs and examines the 
impact of competitive arousal under time pressure on 
market performance in a group-buying setting. Drawing 
on theory from economics, decision theory, and 
information systems, we present a competitive arousal 
model for a social buying setting that posits that 
introducing competitive arousal among buyers reduces 
buyer profits and that social facilitation can mitigate these 
costs through better task completion and time to 
completion rates. Using an economic experiment, we 
found that rivalry has a negative effect on buyer profits 
but also that competitive arousal increases the efficiency
of social facilitation in terms of group formation. We 
discuss the implications of these results.  
Keywords 
Experimental economics, competitive arousal, group buying, 
group coordination, social shopping. 
1. Introduction 
Our research presents an evaluation of a specific 
electronic market design that is based on the principles of 
design science —designing an IT artifact (e.g., an IT-
enabled market mechanism for electronic group-buying 
platforms), implementing it, and then evaluating it (using 
economic performance measures). We argue that 
combining design science [13] with experimental 
economics [37], offers a useful approach to systematically 
design and evaluate new electronic market mechanisms 
and technology features that is applicable for a large range 
of research problems. Using market experiments in the 
laboratory presents a powerful method to evaluate new 
market designs before deploying them in the real 
economy. As an example, this research explores 
specifically the impact of competitive arousal and social 
facilitation under time pressure on group buying 
performance in terms of buyer profits and task completion 
and time to completion. We conducted experiments in the 
laboratory using a variation of the buyer-initiated intra-
auction group buying model [3]. The basic experimental 
environment was the same as the one used in [28].
Social buying platforms support social facilitation with 
features that help buyers form groups and coordinate 
group tasks (negotiating a joint group offer with an agreed 
upon price and submitting it to the seller). Group buying is 
different from individual buying in standard business-to-
consumer electronic commerce in two important ways. 
First, buyers organize into groups in order to aggregate 
demand and leverage increased bargaining power to obtain 
price discounts from the seller. Second, group buying sites 
could offer features that facilitate social interactions 
among buyers. Using an electronic group buying setting is 
interesting for two theoretical reasons. First, buyers no 
longer act individually as they need to interact and 
coordinate with others in order to organize a joint offer for 
a deal with a seller. This raises bid interdependency in 
both private and common value auctions. Second, social 
buying platforms offer tools that support social facilitation 
among buyers at different levels, with possibly different 
impacts on group coordination and performance. The 
literature on individual auctions generally finds that 
competitive arousal leads to overbidding and profit loss 
and that social facilitation can increase competitive 
motivation. 
However, we should also point out that the platform 
sponsors, who control the platform design, also need to be 
aware that offering too much social facilitation (and 
communication support for the buyers) may present a a 
serious risk of buyer collusion to sellers, and they could 
simply decide to defect and stop selling on the platform. 
We present a competitive arousal model for decision-
making under time pressure on a group-buying platform 
that is based on Ku et al [17]. However, we offer two 
critical extensions to Ku’s model. We extend the decision-
making problem from an individual to a group setting and 
we introduce an online communication channel as a social 
facilitation feature. Our experiment replicated the 
established finding from the auction literature that 
inducing competitive arousal (by introducing rivalry 
among buyers) lowers buyer profits. But more 
importantly, we also tested for effects of social facilitation 
on task completion and time to completion. Consistent 
with Ku et al. [17] and Malhotra [21] social facilitation, 
both in terms of presence of co-actors 1  and 
communication, reduced the efficiency of decision-
making. 
                                                        
1 We borrow the co-actor construct from the social facilitation literature 
where it is defined as “individuals all simultaneously engaged in the 
same activity and in full view of each other. [40, p. 270]”
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 Importantly, though, we show that there are also 
significant interaction effects between competition and 
social facilitation that offset some of costs of competitive 
arousal with more efficient group coordination in terms of 
task completion and time to completion when buyers are 
competitively motivated. 
Our study contributes to the auction and social 
commerce literatures. We show that while buyers under 
competitive arousal develop bidding behaviors that violate 
predictions of rational choice theory, buyers also obtain 
some benefits from competitive arousal when buyers act as 
a group with communication capabilities. Introducing 
competitive arousal allows us to study decision-making 
under pressure of online consumers (using a particular 
setting; an electronic group buying platform in our case).  
2.  Theoretical Background and Hypothesis 
development 
We draw on two principle streams of research to 
theoretically ground our study and develop specific 
hypotheses. For one, we look at economics to theorize the 
relationship between buyer group size and surplus 
generated in the market. Second, we borrow from the 
decision making theory in psychology and in information 
systems, to theorize the effects of competitive arousal and 
social facilitation on group performance in terms of buyer 
profits, task completion, and time to completion. 
Research on competitive interaction has shown that 
time pressure is a critical driver for competitive arousal as 
it increases the need to make quick decisions and 
decreases the consideration of the consequences [28, 29,  
35]. Therefore, all the hypotheses we develop below 
assume the presence of time pressure. 
2.1 Task completion 
There is a long tradition in economics in studying 
competitive behavior, the competition for limited and 
contested resources. Generally, competition increases 
efficiency in market settings [14] Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers in a group-
buyer model will tend to reduce the failure rate for task 
completion.
2.2 Buyer profit 
While classic rational choice theory generally views 
competitive behavior as advantageous to the individual 
regarding the achievement of goals, behavioral research 
found that competitively motivated individuals tend to 
abandon rationally determined (optimal) decision rules 
when emotional factors (like competitive arousal) are 
present, especially under time pressure when (a series of) 
judgments and quick decisions need to be made and 
outcomes depend on others’ decisions as well. In such 
situations competitive behavior can hurt the individual 
[10, 12]. The desire to win can overpower original goals 
based on utility maximization and individuals become 
willing to pay more than initially planned and take profit 
losses in order to secure the completion of the given task 
and beat the opponents [5, 20, 15]. Hence we theoretically 
predict the following.  
H2: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
reduce buyer profits. 
Recent research in social commerce suggests that 
social embeddedness of market transactions like social 
interactions with other and online communication features 
can mitigate the effects of competitive pressure [21, 28,
38].  
H3: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
reduce buyer profits more strongly in buyer groups with a 
higher number of co-actors. 
Recent research in social commerce embeddedness of 
market transactions suggest that social embeddedness of 
market transactions like social interactions with other and 
online communication features can mitigate the effects of 
competitive pressure [21, 28, 38].  
H4: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
reduce buyer profits less strongly in buyer groups that 
have access to a communication channel where buyers 
can exchange private messages. 
Pelaez et al. [28] found that communication in group 
settings is most effective in smaller groups. In large 
groups cognitive demands on information processing can 
offset the benefits of having access to more information. 
Hence we propose the following.  
H5: Providing access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages will save more 
profits in buyer groups with a smaller number of co-
actors. 
2.3 Time to task completion 
Researchers have also suggested that under 
competitive arousal individuals will shift from focusing on 
original goals (e.g. profit maximization) to others like 
winning an auction and getting what they wanted in the 
first place. Such a reversal of preferences can lead to a 
more aggressive pursuit of secondary goals [2]. Hence we 
propose:  
H6: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
speed up the time to task completion. 
However, Pelaez et al. [28] found that offering 
communication capabilities tend to distract users as they 
exchange off-topic messages which can decrease the time 
to completing the set task. Their study also indicates that 
group size negatively affects group coordination. Thus, we 
predict the following two hypotheses.  
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 H7: Providing access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages will tend to slow 
down the time to task completion. 
H8: Increasing the number of co-actors in buyer groups 
will tend to slow down the time to task completion. 
Social facilitation in terms of presence of an audience 
(i.e., in our case, presence of co-actors) can heighten the 
effects of competitive arousal and increase dominant 
responses and enhance performance on salient tasks [17,
40]. Bigger audiences, or larger number of co-actors, 
exhibit this effect more strongly than smaller ones [11]. 
Hence, we posit the following.  
H9: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
speed up the time to completion more strongly in buyer 
groups with a higher number of co-actors. 
Increasing communication capacity should enable 
buyers to share more information and thus coordinate 
better with the member of their buyer group in comparison 
to groups without the added communication mechanism 
[6]. Enhanced communication should prove to make it 
easier for groups to form and complete their tasks. When 
individuals are competitively motivated and rely on others 
for achieving the desired outcome, more information and 
increased communication should result in more efficient 
group formation [34]. Thus, we expect that relationships 
form more readily in the presence of additional 
communication  
H10: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
speed up the time to completion more strongly in buyer 
groups that have access to a communication channel 
where buyers can exchange private messages. 
Finally, Chen et al. [3] have shown that technology 
provides effective communication in intra-auction bidding 
clubs but coordination becomes more difficult as the 
member base increases. Hence, we theorize the following.  
H11: Providing access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages will slow down the 
time to task completion more strongly in buyer groups 
with a higher number of co-actors.
3. Methodology 
3.1 Experimental design 
We designed and economic experiment that created an 
electronic market in the laboratory where participants were 
asked to coordinate group purchases of a single product 
from a monopolistic seller. While the basic experimental 
environment was the same as in [28]: Each individual 
buyer has a private, pre-assigned value for the same single 
product. Consumer valuations vary across buyers and each 
buyer needs to buy one unit of the product. The 
participants were recruited from an undergraduate student 
subject pool and were compensated with course credit. 
However, we made a number of important modifications 
and additions to the basic design as described next. 
We used a 2×2×2 factorial design in which we 
manipulated three variables at two levels, competitive 
arousal and two factors of social facilitation (presence of 
co-actors and communication capabilities). We induced 
time pressure by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-half 
minutes each. This was held constant in all treatments. The 
specific time limit was determined after several rounds of 
pilot runs. This time window was sufficient for groups to 
complete their given tasks but short enough to make them 
feel that they needed to make decision quickly.  
Competitive arousal (CA) was induced by creating 
rivalry. In one treatment (CA=low) only one group was 
present to negotiate bids with the seller. In another 
(CA=high) two rival groups were created. The members of 
the groups were pre-assigned. Buyers could either place an 
opening bid (proposed purchasing price offered to the 
seller) or join an existing bid within the group. Under the 
competition mechanism, for each group, only the buyers 
who are willing and quick enough to join a common offer 
with an agreed bid price have the chance to become the 
actual buyers (if the bid is successful). For the groups 
without the competition mechanism, all buyers are in the 
same group, and therefore, there is no competition from a 
rival group.  
Social facilitation was represented by two variables, 
presence of co-actors (ACT) and level of communication
(CC). First, we compared the presence of a small number 
of co-actors (ACT=1) with the presence of a large number 
of co-actors (ACT=3). The co-actors were represented by 
the other buyers in the groups. In other words, in the 
former treatment (ACT=1) the buyer groups were of size 
two, and in the latter (ACT=3) groups were of size four. 
Our operationalization of large and small groups is similar 
to those in prior research [5, 21].  
The third manipulation compared low with high 
communication capacity among buyers. At the high level 
(CC=high) we included a communication channel as a 
feature on the buyer screen while no such communication 
channel was offered at the low level. We implemented the 
communication channel with a communication box, 
similar to an Internet chat box, where buyers could post 
and receive private messages from their fellow group 
members.  
3.2 Procedure 
Each session consisted of groups with 1 seller 
(monopolist) and either 2, 4 or 8 potential buyers. Upon 
entering the lab, the participants were randomly assigned 
to computer terminals with a seller screen for the seller 
and a buyer screen for the buyers.  Once the participants 
were seated, they were asked to review a set of 
instructions [see Appendices 7.1 and 7.2] that provided 
information about the group buying mechanism and their 
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 respective roles and tasks. Each session consisted of one 
practice period and 10 additional periods, where buyers 
worked to coordinate group offers to make bids to the 
seller. Each round lasted 150 seconds.  
The buyer and seller tasks were similar across all eight 
treatments with some important differences. In the 
treatments with communication channel buyers could use 
a chat box to exchange private messages, which was not 
available in treatments without the communication 
channel. The manipulation of the number of co-actors 
changes the number of other buyers required for a group, 
but it did not affect the interface of the buyer screens or 
their principle tasks. In treatments without competition, 
participants were assigned to a group before the round 
(static groups). In treatments with completion rival groups 
were set up and buyers could join and switch groups 
depending on currently posted bids (dynamic groups).  
Buyers could increase their joint offer or join a 
different offer if their bid was not accepted. The buyer 
screen was more complex [as illustrated in the two sample 
buyer screens in Appendix 7.3]. First, it showed them the 
assigned valuation of the product. Each buyer had a 
unique, private product valuation that was randomly 
selected from a uniform distribution (25,100). To reduce 
the potential for learning effects, the product valuation 
values were rotated every period. Except for the initial bid, 
which could be placed by any buyer, bids could only be 
changed in one dollar increments. Once bids were placed, 
the other buyers could "join" the bid if the bid price was 
below their product value, thus preventing overbidding.
Once the requisite number of buyers (2 or 4) joined, group 
formation occurred and the bid would be submitted to the 
seller (task completion).
In the treatments with competition, buyers could join 
any bid, thus allowing for dynamically forming groups.
E.g., a buyer could choose a bid for 20, but then decide to 
join another offer at 19, which could have been created by 
a different group of participants. By allowing buyers to 
join different offers, we establish competition between 
buyers. The interface only tells the buyer the number of 
buyers in the group but it doesn't indicate who the other 
buyers are. In the treatment with a private communication 
channel buyers were able to exchange messages via an 
instant message type of communication box. 
The tasks and interface for the seller essentially 
remained unchanged across treatments. The seller received 
bids once a group formed and made a joint offer. The 
seller’s screen showed the bid price, the number of people 
who joined in the bid and the cumulative amount of the 
offer [see Appendix 7.4 for an illustrative seller screen 
shot]. The seller then had the opportunity to accept the bid, 
terminating the current session, or take no action and leave 
the bid active, thus allowing time for other bids to form. 
Sellers only see the highest bid that meets the requisite 
number of buyers, therefore, only one bid at a time is 
visible to the sellers at any given time.
When a transaction occurred, i.e. a seller accepted an 
offer from the buyer group, both the seller’s profit and 
buyer’s profit was calculated and shown to the 
participants. Buyer profits (i.e., buyer surplus) were 
computed for each buyer as transaction price less product 
valuation No profits accrued when a round ended with no 
bids being accepted. The cumulative profit over all ten 
periods was used to compare how each buyer performed in 
the experiment. 
3.3 Experimental variables 
Table 1. Experimental variables
Independent 
Variables
competitive arousal
(CA = low or high);
Communication level   
(CC = yes or no)
presence of co-actors
(ACT= 1 or 3)
Dependent 
Variables
buyer profit (summed over 
all buyers and rounds)
task completion 
(completing purchase )
time to completion
Control 
Variables
time pressure (auction 
length = 150 secs)
experimental periods 
(P1, P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1)
4. Data analysis 
4.1 Descriptive analysis  
The experiment was carried out with a total of 77 
groups. One group included one seller and two, four or 
eight potential buyers. Data were collected from each 
group over 10 rounds of the collective bidding. The 
experiment represents a typical 2x2x2 factorial design 
with repeated measures.  
Out of the 770 group-level biddings by the 77 groups, 
task completion occurred with 573 bids from 76 groups,
that is, those bids that were successful and accepted by a
seller. Table 2 shows the number of successful bids and 
the groups that generated them broken down by 
experimental treatments. Manipulating the three treatment 
variables competitive arousal (CA), presence of co-actors 
(ACT), and presence of communication channel (CC) at 
two levels each yields a total of eight treatments.  
The descriptive analysis of the (successful) group 
bidding is summarized in table 3. We removed rounds 
with unsuccessful bids from the correlation analysis 
because for unsuccessful bids task completion could not 
occur and hence time to completion could not be 
measured. 
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 Table 2. Successful bid summary
#bids (#groups)
Communication 
Channel
CC=yes CC=no
CA=low ACT=1 85 (11) 94 (13)
ACT=3 75 (12) 42 (8)
CA=high ACT=1 69 (8) 68 (8)
ACT=3 70 (8) 70 (8)
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
 
# Bid
Buyer 
Profit
Time to 
Completion
  Mean SD Mean SD
CA Low 296 43.1 13.5 23.2 22.7
High 277 36.7 12.9 9.4 5.5
CC No 299 40.1 14.1 15.2 14.4
Yes 274 39.9 12.9 18.0 21.5
ACT Small 316 40.6 15.2 14.3 14.2
Large 257 39.3 11.2 19.3 21.7
Grand Total 573 40.0 13.6 16.5 18.1
CA .. competitive arousal; ACT .. number of 
co-actors; CC … availability of 
communication channel
A nonparametric Spearman’s rho correlation analysis 
was conducted, summarized in table 4, to investigate the 
correlations between the three main treatments and the two 
dependent variables buyer profit and time to task 
completion (i.e. completed purchase).
The correlation analysis shows that competitive arousal 
is positively correlated with both buyer profit and the time 
for task completion, and both correlations are significant at 
the 0.01 level. Number of co-actors is positively correlated 
with the time for task completion, and the correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level.  
Table 4. Spearman's rho  correlations
Profit Time Period CPT CM
Profit
Time -.084*
Period -.061 -.210**
CPT -.231** -.504** -.033
CM -.009 .056 .018 .039
GS -.046 .104* .032 .111** -.077
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.2 Hypothesis testing  
Main test 1—Logistic regression. When rival groups 
were created, increasing competitive arousal, the failure 
rate, p, for successfully completing the task making a 
group purchase in an experimental round significantly 
decreased from 0.342 when competitive arousal was low 
to 0.134 when it was high. The odds ratio of competition 
arousal (0 /1) is 0.298.  
Odds ratio=[ p0/(1- p0)]/[ p1/(1- p1)]
A simple logistic regression test shows that injecting 
competition arousal can significantly reduce the failure 
rate for completing the task (table 5). This supports H1. 
Table 5. Logistic regression 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. OddsRatio
CA -1.19 .19 37.82 1 .00 .30
α 1.86 .16 129.16 1 .00 6.44
pseudo R-squares:
Cox & Snell R Square=0.056
Nagelkerke R Square=0.082
The unsuccessful bidding attempts were regarded as 
missing values for the remaining analysis, yielding an 
unequal sample size for our 2×2×2 factorial design with 
repeated measures. In order to control the effect of 
repeated measures for the unequal sample size, we applied 
two sets of statistical examinations, a multiple linear 
regressions as the main test, followed by a mixed model 
analysis with maximum likelihood estimation as a
robustness test. 
Main test 2—multiple linear regression. We employed 
dummy coding to convert the categorical variables 
competitive arousal (CA), presence of co-actors (CA) and 
communication (CC) into dichotomous variables. 
Specifically, for the treatment with weak presence of co-
actors (1 other buyer in a group, or group size of two)
ACT was coded as “0”, and for strong presence of co-
actors (3 other buyers in a group, or group size of four) 
ACT=“1”. Similarly, for the treatment without the 
availability of a communication channel CC was coded as 
“0”, and with communication channel CM=“1”; and for 
the treatment without competitive arousal, CA was coded 
as “0”, and with competitive arousal, CA was coded as “1”.
An additional 9 dummy variables (P1, P2, …, P9) were 
generated to represent the experimental periods 1 to 9, 
while “period” 10 served as the reference measure. Two 
separate regression tests were conducted to analyze the 
proposed hypotheses on the two dependent variables 
“(buyer) profit” and on “time (for task completion)” 
respectively.  
We combine the results of the two separate tests in one 
table (Table 6), one test for buyer profits, aggregated 
across buyers and rounds, and the other on the time for 
task completion. In order to examine the contribution of 
main effects and interaction effects, we did a hierarchical 
multiple linear regression in three stages, “Model 1”, 
“Model 2”, and “Model 3”, in which we added the control 
variables, “period”, the main effects “competition 
mechanism”, “communication channel”, and “group size”,
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 and three two-way interaction effects respectively.  The 9 
dummy variables, P1 through P9 are included in the test in 
order to control the effect of repeated measurement (round 
effects). The coefficients of P1 through P9 indicate the 
differences in profit or time between a specific period and 
the reference period 10. By statistically controlling for the 
effects of repeated measures, we obtain more valid results 
regarding the treatment effects in the experiment.
Table 6. Multiple linear regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Profit Time Profit Time Profit Time
α 34.9** 15.3** 38.4** 17.6** 39.9** 13.9**
P1 .4 10.5** .1 10.6** -.0 11.2**
P2 7.0** 1.7 7.0** 2.4 7.0** 3.2
P3 9.2** 3.2 9.2** 3.7 9.1** 4.6
P4 4.2† -.8 4.3† -.1 4.3† .5
P5 4.3† -.3 3.9† -.5 3.7 .2
P6 11.4** .1 10.9** -.5 10.9** -.5
P7 12.1** .7 11.6** .1 11.7** .3
P8 3.2 -1.9 2.8 -2.7 2.7 -2.2
P9 -.7 -2.1 -1.3 -3.1 -1.3 -2.4
CA -6.3** -15.0** -9.9** -5.0*
CC -.1 4.1** -2.8† 6.0**
ACT -.4 7.1** -.1 10.8**
CA*CC 7.3** -9.3**
CA*ACT .6 -13.3**
CC*ACT -2.1 7.2**
∆R2-Profit .111 .055 .017
∆R2-Time .038 .196 .049
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. 
Model 1 to Model 3: Control Variables, Main Effects, 
and Interaction Effects
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Buyer profit (H2 – H5). In terms of buyer profit, the only 
significant main effect is competition mechanism, while 
the only significant two-way interaction effect is 
contributed by competition mechanism and 
communication channels. The results in “Model 2” show 
that the buyer profit of the groups with competitive arousal 
is $6.3 less than the buyer profit of the groups without it,
which is significant at the 0.01 level, and which 
contributes 5.5% of explanatory power. In other words, 
introducing competition among buyers reduces buyer 
profits, benefiting the seller. This result supports H2.  
The results in “Model 3” show that the interaction of 
competition and communication are positively related to 
group profit (at 0.01 level), contributing 1.7% of 
explanatory power. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction 
effects of competition and communication on group profit. 
Introducing competition, we observed the expected profit 
sacrifice, but we also found that making a communication 
channel available to buyers plays a positive role in 
mitigating the profit loss that results from the competitive 
arousal. This supports H4. Our hypotheses H3 and H5, 
however, were not supported.   
Time to Task Completion (H6 – H11). In terms of time 
for task completion, all three proposed main effects are 
significant, supporting H6-H8. According to the results in 
Model 2, competitive arousal reduces the time to task 
completion, making a group purchase, by about 15 
seconds (significant at the 0.01 level). Making a 
communication channel available to buyers slows the time 
for task competing down by about 4 seconds while 
increasing the presence of co-actors slows it down by 
about 7 seconds (both effects are significant at the 0.01 
level). The three main effects together contribute 19.6% of 
predictive power.  
The two-way interaction effects of competition and 
communication (figure 2) and those of competition and 
presence of co-actors in terms of number of co-actors 
present in a group (figure 3) are negatively significant at 
the 0.01 level. The interaction effects of communication 
level and presence of co-actors (figure 4) are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 level. These two-way-interaction 
effects together contribute 4.9% of explanatory power.
These results support hypotheses H9 to H11. 
Our results indicate that competition can reduce the 
time for task completion and that offering communication 
channels can significantly enhance this effect (figure 2). 
The results of the interaction effects of competitive arousal 
and presence of co-actors show that competitive 
motivation helps groups with more co-actors to become 
more efficient than groups with fewer co-actors (figure 3). 
The interaction effects of communication level and 
34
38
42
46
No Competition Competition
Pr
of
it 
($
)
Figure 1. Interaction effects of 
competition and communication 
on buyer profit
Without Communication
With Communication
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 number of co-actors indicates that the two treatments 
could reinforce each other in slowing down the time for 
task completion (figure 4).
Finally, we also report that the three-way interaction of 
CA*ACT*CC was also statistically significant, but 
because of the general complexity of three-way 
interactions we refrain from attempting to offer a 
theoretical explanation for the effect in this paper.  
Robustness tests. To check the robustness of the main 
tests, we also conducted a mixed model analysis on the 
two dependent variables. The test results for the two 
dependent variables, were highly consistent with the 
results of the main test. 
Summary of hypothesis tests. The hypothesis testing results 
are summarized in table 9.
Table 9. Summary of Hypothesis Testing
# DV / Hypothesis
Task Completion
H1
Increasing competitive arousal in buyers in a group-
buyer model will tend to reduce the failure rate for 
task completion.  
sup
Buyer Profit – Main Effect
H2 Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits.  sup
Buyer Profit – Interaction Effects
H3
Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend 
to reduce buyer profits more strongly in buyer 
groups with a higher number of co-actors.
n.s.
H4
Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend 
to reduce buyer profits less strongly in buyer groups 
that have access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages.
sup
H5
Providing access to a communication channel 
where buyers can exchange private messages will 
save more profits in buyer groups with a smaller 
number of co-actors.
n.s
Time to Task Completion –
Main Effects
H6 Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to speed up the time to task completion.  sup
H7
Providing access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages will tend to 
slow down the time to task completion.  
sup
H8 Increasing the number of co-actors in buyer groups will tend to slow down the time to task completion. sup
Time to Task Completion –
Interaction Effects
H9
Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
speed up the time to completion more strongly in 
buyer groups with a higher number of co-actors.  
sup
H10
Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to 
speed up the time to completion more strongly in 
buyer groups that have access to a communication 
channel where buyers can exchange private 
messages
sup.
H11
Providing access to a communication channel where 
buyers can exchange private messages will slow 
down the time to task completion more strongly in 
buyer groups with a higher number of co-actors.
sup
       n.s. refers to ‘not supported; sup. refers to ‘supported’
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 5. Conclusions 
This study has a number of limitations. While the 
experimental design was tested in some early pilot tests 
and subsequently refined and improved several times, a 
number of potential design limitations became only 
apparent after data collection had been under way or 
completed.  The following are the most critical ones. (1) 
Level of time pressure was held constant across all 
treatments. Manipulating time pressure could yield 
additional insights on the effects of competitive arousal (2) 
The bidding mechanism that was implemented (bid 
changes in one dollar increments only) may have 
complicated price negotiation among buyers in case where 
the valuation spreads were high. (3) A small, linear time 
cost was incurred to buyers and sellers in each round that 
may have had an effect on some bidding decisions. (4) 
Participants were compensated with course credit, which 
may not have been sufficient to induce economic behavior 
in every case. (5) The experiment only implemented one 
specific type of (buyer-initiated) group-buying model, 
which limits generalization beyond this particular model.  
(6) It is unclear how robust our results are with respect to 
changes in the pre-assigned demand schedules (product 
valuations) for the buyers. Finally, (7), we did not analyze 
seller data in the present study.  
Our study contributes a novel approach combining 
design science and experimental economics for the 
purpose of designing and evaluation electronic market 
mechanism and platform designs and applied it to an 
example case from electronic commerce, using a bidding 
mechanism in an electronic group buying setting as a 
specific example. The study also offers an elaboration on 
Ku et al.‘s competitive arousal model for decision making 
[15] that introduces two novel features, the setting of a 
group-decision making problem the addition of 
communication level as an antecedent. The present 
research adds to our understanding of competitive 
behavior by considering the mitigating effects of offering 
communication capabilities on decision outcomes. Finally, 
we contribute to the emerging social commerce literature 
by offering a novel, competitive arousal model that helps 
explain bidding outcomes in electronic group buying.  
Finally, the study has also some practical 
implications for designers of group buying platforms 
and operators of group buying sites. Our findings 
suggest that introducing competition among buyers 
and offering communication tools that support group 
coordination can help speeding up inventory turnover 
and also help to protect profit margins for sellers. We 
also suggest that group size matters and needs to be 
determined carefully, depending on the levels of 
competition and communication support.
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Example Instructions for Buyers  
General Overview 
You will be presented with one item to place a bid. Each product has a 
specific value to you. A small time cost is assessed to you as the round 
progresses. During each round you will try to acquire each of the items 
for the best (lowest) possible price. You must work with other buyers to 
purchase the product. It requires two buyers to agree on a price before the 
seller can accept an offer. Your goal is to generate as much cumulative 
profit as possible, which is equal to the values of the products minus the 
sum of amounts you pay for them and your time costs. Each round will 
last two and a half minutes. There will be one practice followed by a 
number of “real” rounds. The total time for the entire exercise will be 
approximately one hour.  
Bidding Rules 
Any buyer may submit a bid. You may join a bid that is no greater than 
the value of the item. You may submit a new bid as long as it is greater 
than the highest bid.  Start your bidding low to maximize potential profit. 
New bids can only be done in increments of 1; therefore they can be 1 
dollar higher than the maximum bid or 1 dollar lower than the minimum 
bid. Once you join a bid you will not be able to remove yourself from 
that offer. Once two bidders join an offer, the bid is automatically 
submitted to the seller. If the value of the item drops below the current 
bid price, the offer will be removed.  The value of an item may be 
different for each buyer. 
Making Money 
The profit you earn is equal to the value of the item bought, the bid you 
submit for the item, minus the time cost you spend for it. For example, if 
“item A” is worth $90 to you and you won the item at the end of the 
auction with a joint bid of $65, and your time cost spent is $5, you will 
earn a profit of ($90 - $65) - $5 = $20
Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your ten individual 
round profits 
Key Summary Points 
 Your goal is to make money 
 You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. 
 Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the 
end 
 Make sure you work with other buyers to get the best possible 
price.  
 Remember you need at least two buyers to make an offer  
 Start your bidding low to give yourself the best possible profit 
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 7.2 Instructions for Sellers (Small Groups) 
General Overview 
You will be presented with two units of one item that you want to sell in 
an auction. You have a small cost associated with the time you spend in 
the auction. During each round you will try to sell your item for the 
highest possible price.  Your goal is to generate as much profit as 
possible, which is equal to the price at which you sell the item minus the 
time cost you spend for it. Each round will last two and a half minutes. 
There will be one practice round and a number of “real” rounds. The total 
time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour. 
Bidding Rules 
Your product is automatically entered into the auction allowing bidders 
to submit bids, which you may accept. A bid will only be submitted to 
you when 2 buyers join the offer. You may choose to accept the bid at 
anytime or allow the bid to expire. The auction will end once you accept 
an offer or at the end of, 150 seconds (two and a half minutes).  
Making Money 
The round profit you earn is equal to the highest offer you accept for the 
item minus the time cost for the item. For example, if the offer you 
accept is $90 at the end of the auction, and your time cost is $10,  
you will earn a profit of $90 - $10 = $80. Your total game profit will be 
equal to the total of all your round profits 
Key Summary Points 
 Your goal is to make money 
 Try and get the largest profit possible  
 You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. 
 Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the 
end. 
7.3 Example Buyer Screens 
7.4 Example Seller Screen 
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